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Realism In The United Nations

STALIN'S IDEA OF the immediate post-war organization of the world was a continuation of the Anglo-American alliance with Russian power, proof against any persistence or revival of the Nazi-Japanese threat or imitation of it by others. Russia would thus be able to consolidate her dominance of Eastern Europe, to play a strong hand in the Far East, and perhaps to direct France and Italy through strong Communist parties; in any case, to make her recovery entirely secure. Churchill and Roosevelt got France and China seated at the central table, symbols of wider European and Asian participation in a world system, plus a general association of cooperative states selected mainly by virtue of their position or attitudes in the crisis of 1939-45.

Soon it became apparent that the real issues lay not between the original group of "peace-loving states" (i.e., the alliance and its associates) and their recent enemies, but between intransigent Communist expansion and those prepared to resist it. The Communists grasped 700 million people outside Russia, while non-Communist powers were releasing 600 millions from their colonial control. In 1950 surprise and circumstance were turned by bold leadership into a considerable rallying of the UN against the crude Communist invasion of the UN's own ward, South Korea. That rally petered out, however, as the Communists readjusted their tactics, and it can hardly be repeated. The Marshall Plan, the maintenance of Berlin against blockade, the recovery of West Germany, NATO and other defensive groupings, brought some sense of security to threatened portions of the non-Communist world, though uncertainly qualified by Russian economic advance, aggressive propaganda and diplomacy, and development of nuclear power. Neutralism has spread. The leaders of non-Communist effort appear to lack imaginative purpose or program, and are greatly embarrassed in particular problems in various parts of the world, often made acute by Communist intrigue and incitement.

The UN has plodded along through this deeply unfavorable situation, fostering on a modest scale various social and technical services of international value, and providing a regularly established meeting-

place for opponents and neutrals, a platform for debate, accusation, and propaganda under somewhat elastic rules of decency. The Security Council, almost paralyzed by basic contention and by Soviet vetoes, has declined in importance and in frequency of meetings. The Assembly, enlarged gradually from fifty-one to sixty members, and now suddenly to seventy-six, has tried to influence and to supplant the Security Council, driven partly by non-Communist efforts to smother or to circumvent the Russian veto, but even more by the rising volume of Asian-African and Latin American voices. The only expanding imperialism, the Russo-Communist, has ably and unscrupulously exploited anti-colonial and nationalist sentiment of many decades and of many hues, while the targets have had neither the will nor the means to fire at the guns. Is it possible for Britain, France and the United States to face the situation as a whole and with constructive imagination, rather than to lose piece by piece in sullen reluctance with maximum damage? From some points of view the British contribution since 1945 is stupendous—India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, some moves in Africa. If this process could be formulated in great-minded policy, projected into the future, dramatized for present understanding, and appropriately draw in France and the United States, the potentialities for the world situation are enormous.

Recent additions to the membership of the UN will markedly increase the minority of Communist voices, though they will not automatically reduce the non-Communist plurality. The Asian-African bloc gains votes. Americans and their associates must be prepared to see more votings in the UN go against their will and judgment. This will augment the isolationist and nationalist cries for withdrawal, for reduction of the UN budget, for action outside the UN rather than within it. The abnormal aggressiveness and intolerable manners of Communists 1945-1952, if a terminus can be set, produced a long series of votes, fifty to five, against them, pathetically comforting to those accustomed to the forms of democracy. It does not now seem that these rather empty victories can recur.

The enlarged membership registers the trend toward universality of the UN as a forum and as a welfare association. This has merit in a wicked world. The trend is also away from any significant stand for the high purposes declared in democratic terms in the Charter of the UN, or for the UN as a direct deterrent to aggression. Bulgaria and Rumania, Franco and Portugal, the scarcely responsible Laos and Libya, indicate the entering breeds along with those more obviously satisfactory—Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy. Why did the Russians insist upon Outer Mongolia, a few hundred thousand herdsmen so completely blanketed in the Communist system that they have no international acquaintance whatsoever, so entirely innocent of the trappings of sovereignty that they do not support one diplomat either in Moscow or in Peking? Do the Communists wish to destroy in the UN all respect for truth and for self, breaking down still further the morale of an organization that has dared repeatedly to block Communist claims? Perhaps in the background lies the cynical concept of a meaningless pawn, to be set off insultingly against Nationalist China or Japan for purpose of extortion and maddening confusion. The lines seem to be laid for displacement of Nationalist China by Communist China, though manner and time are not clear. The former indeed cannot be defended as claimant to the vast country which the Chiang regime lost and fled.

These years call for steady building-up in the face of provocation, for the widest cooperation that imagination and tact can secure. Without the UN we revert to sheer military politics. With it, we have a troublous chance. M.S.B.

EDITORIAL NOTES

We have a nice Christmas note to add to our recent report about the heresy trials of the Northwest Synod of the United Lutheran Church. One of our subscribers in Princeton, N. J., having read the account, sent a check of \$2000 to the author of the article, the Reverend Clarence Kilde, to distribute as a Christmas gift to the three young ministers who were tried for heresy. Mr. Kilde distributed the generous gift in consultation with the young ministers, and in proportion to their several needs. We have a feeling that this Christmas gift was more in accord with the spirit of the Christ than the insistence of the church that his followers must validate their trust in him by belief that he was born of a virgin.

When recently Clement Atlee resigned from the leadership of the British Labor Party, the party elected Hugh Gaitskell, formerly the Labor Chancellor of the Exchequer, as his successor over the "left wing" stormy

petrel of Labor politics, Anuerin Bevan. A good deal of British, and indeed European social and political history, is reflected in this election.

Gaitskell is a middle class economist who received the overwhelming support of the great trade unions. Bevan is in origin a Welsh miner, who received the support of only the largely middle class constituency labor parties. This line-up is significant, for it reflects the actual political sentiments all over Europe. Doctrinaire socialism is a combination of vehement class resentments and middle class liberal utopianism. The main force of the labor movement supports, on the other hand, moderate political programs intent upon bettering hours and wages and preserving the foundations of the welfare state. The trade unions in Britain have elected Gaitskell, in short, for the same reason that the American trade unions never took kindly to a labor party or to doctrinaire, or even mild, socialism. Labor is thoroughly pragmatic in setting its proximate goals. That is why Lenin believed that "trade union psychology" would be unable, unaided, to generate "revolutionary enthusiasm." Only the historical perspective of the middle class revolutionary, with his alleged map of history, would be able to envisage the long range goal of a paradise on earth.

Bevan is not Communist but he accurately reflects the combination of doctrinaire utopianism and residual class resentments which express themselves in Marxism. Gaitskell is not George Meany, the new head of the combined trade unions of this nation. British and American circumstances, which produced these men, are different. But it is possible to discern similarities under the differences. These similarities prove that the future in both Britain and America, and perhaps in the whole of Western civilization, has no place for either revolution or doctrinaire political programs. Revolutions are generated by desperation and dreams. Both are lacking in Anglo-Saxon politics. Doctrinaire politics are generated by dreams alone. The common sense of our democracies inevitably makes for pragmatic democratic theories. Whether the vast concentration of power in the united labor movement is a good thing for democracy is another question. Ideally democracy flourishes by a balance of many centers of power.

The foolish anti-imperial speeches in Asia by the two Communist leaders have at least one good result, or will, if they remind the Western world that the conflict is not a simple one between "freedom" and "tyranny." That is to reduce it to too simple proportions and to forget that the main battle ground between democracy and communism has come to be the vast expanses of Asia and Africa where six million people have been emancipated from colonialism and one

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The Problem of the Problem of Juvenile Delinquency

ROBERT W. SPIKE

AS THE MINISTER of a church that has spent much time, money and anguish in the last four years trying to cope with teen-age problems in our neighborhood, I am concerned about the fad-like proportions that such activity may assume.

There is no question but what the rise in acts of aggressive antisocial behavior among teen agers is serious, but there is growing evidence that the public attention now drawn to the category "juvenile delinquency" also has serious consequences.

In fact, there is something ambiguous about the term that makes it misleading and thus dangerous. For one thing, it is too broad a category. Every act of adolescent behavior that offends adults mores is labelled juvenile delinquency. This extends all the way from the really critical acts of crime to school truancy and loud talking in the street. This incredible blurring of distinctions makes all problems of youth abstract, and therefore confuses the processes that must be undertaken separately and distinctively to meet the problems. Perhaps due to the over-coverage of news that radio, television, newspapers, movie newsreels, and news magazines now amass, there is a public image created by the formula "juvenile delinquency," that ranks along with "polio" and "cancer." The disease-like connotations of the image produce two reactions in the public mind. One is, strangely enough, to dehumanize the crises that produce unrest and furnish young people with the material for really bizarre brutality. Over and over again, people say to me, "I feel guilty because I'm not doing anything about the problem of 'juvenile delinquency.'" These people range from old ladies who have lost interest in the WCTU as a cause, to parents of growing children. Last spring there was the story of the family in the Bronx whose model son was mistakenly killed in a gang fight. The father was a civic leader and had been known as a fighter against "juvenile delinquency." After the tragic death of the son, the father announced that he was going to move his family back to Pennsylvania, and retire from his civic leadership. For a week or more the newspapers led the city in appealing to the father not to abandon the fight. The picture was complicated by the fact that the District Attorney's office made an announcement which hinted that the son had not been so "model" after all. There was a saga-like character to the whole episode that epitomizes the stereotyped picture Americans use when dealing with tragedy.

The disease analogy also encourages people in the illusion that there are overall solutions to the problem, or at least a simple combination of cures.

The social worker, the liberals and the enlightened press for better housing, more clinics and treatment centers, more recreation facilities and more social workers. The unenlightened and the conservative urge stronger police protection, sterner judicial disposition of youth cases. In fact, a kind of warfare is being waged over the issue of "juvenile delinquency" that really has its roots in radically different areas of human nature. The social work point of view, which always is rehabilitative and optimistic in outlook, is viewed with increasing suspicion by the civic leaders who do not have social work training. For a number of years, because social workers were specialists, they were held in awe by the elected official and first citizens. As anxiety mounts in city after city, long suppressed hostilities against "permissiveness" and "retraining" appear. Judges like Samuel Liebowitz make public statements condemning the coddling of young people. The know-nothing press whets the appetite of the frightened public by doing sensational exposés of social work oriented public institutions¹ and modern educational techniques in the public schools. A New York tabloid recently carried this caption under a picture of a man on a stretcher on his way to the hospital: "Schoolteacher beaten by student could not defend himself because of 'loving care' theory in school." Veteran social workers have generally been reluctant to get in the debate to challenge the "spare the rod, spoil the child" school of public policy. Recently, however, at the Law Enforcement Institute on Youth and Crime, held in Syracuse, N. Y., Dr. Ralph M. Brancole, director of New Jersey's diagnostic center at Menlo Park, sounded a warning. He urged the group not to underestimate the high incidence of mental and emotional disturbance found among delinquents. "While not every delinquent is psychopathic," he said, "it is the major task of enforcement officials and psychiatrists to isolate the deeply disturbed youngster and provide him with clinical treatment."

"The more neurotic a youngster, the less he will benefit from sanctions," Dr. Brancole declared. He added that many offenders, in fact, deliberately sought punishment in order to justify their hostility toward society.²

It is also true that the forces generally represented as being social work oriented have been guilty of oversimplifications in the past. A too facile prescrip-

¹ *New York World Telegram* in April, 1955, printed two articles attacking Riverside Hospital, the only hospital for teen-age drug users in the U.S.

² *New York Times*, July 7, 1955, p. 29

tion for society's ills is expressed in programs and plans to upgrade the environment of the city. New housing, better schools, and the like are certainly desperately needed, and there is of course a strong correlation between underprivilege and antisocial behavior. And yet the problem is more a product of subtle combinations of personality structures, the breakdown of supporting heritage and these obvious environmental cancers. An appreciation of the depth of the cultural crisis is the necessary context in which to understand and deal with all the variety of human maladjustment summed up by the term, "juvenile delinquency."

The more astute social workers can no longer be accused of naivete about human relations, due largely to the growing influence of psychiatric social work. Graduates of the better schools of social work no longer apply techniques, either group work or case work, like mustard plasters. They no longer have a social millennialist point of view. Most still seem to be very confused about what metaphysical context they are operating in. In most cases it seems to be a kind of cultural anthropology with ingraftings of a co-operative democratic ethic. Christian forces do much better, however, to give their support to such people, when the alternative is a kind of belligerent punishment. The problems of law enforcement as a part of a just society can be discussed and worked out in such a context, but mercy and compassion cannot be held in company with a rigid line of thinking that sees only retribution as a solution to youth's problems.

Between those who would apply a kind of societal analgesic to the problem and the wielders of the police billy club is the larger number of the public. This group is tempted a little bit in both directions but settles safely on recreation and more recreation as a cure-all.

This solution obviously arises from the diagnosis that what is wrong with our youth is simply improper use of leisure time. Boys will be boys, and if we supply enough settlement houses, playgrounds, little leagues, camping trips and arts and crafts, everything will be all right. It would be foolish to discredit the real truth that lies in the need for constructive alternatives for adolescent interest and yet to misread the anxious, neurotic drives for daring action that underlie gang murders or drug addiction in terms of needs for hobbies is to fool ourselves. The meaning of life itself is at issue for many boys, as they deliberately involve themselves in criminal activity. Although they cannot generally articulate it, most boys know the consequences of things like drug use, and yet see no other compelling force in their lives that offers them as much emotional satisfaction. At the risk of overdramatizing, drug use is often a sacrament of the meaninglessness of life.

Large sums of money are now being made avail-

able for youth recreation. We must be ready for the disillusionment that will set in when it becomes apparent that all the fine gym equipment in the world does not do the trick. Only the gift of love that is sometimes incorporated in the lives of personnel in the gyms and clubs will be of benefit. And, as Bettelheim³ is continually pointing out to us, "love" is not enough. The restructuring of the values of American life that is now in process is directly involved, and we must expect a long siege of noticeable adolescent unrest for years to come (particularly when we keep telling adolescents that they are supposed to be difficult).

There is room only to mention one other aspect of the new configuration "juvenile delinquency." That is the way so many interests and institutions use it as a front for other purposes. Both liberal and reactionary organizations use the threat of juvenile delinquency as part of the package of reasons why they should be supported. As we have pointed out, this is related to a conflict going on in American life as to a basic interpretation of human nature. Super patriotic organizations and conservative veterans' groups sponsor recreational programs and citizens' participation drills (like Boys' State, etc.) and so request public support for the total organization. Liberal organizations urge the passage of local government reform bills and social legislation in the name of the magic formula.

Politicians have been very conscious of how sensitized people are to the issue, and it has become increasingly a larger factor in political platforms and speech making. In fact, following last year's election, Governor Harriman of New York State, and his Republican Attorney General, Jacob Javits, found themselves in a very undignified scrap over which one was going to lead the fight against delinquency in the state.

Even religious organizations find it the most appealing touchstone of public interest. Catholic parochial schools have stressed heavily the role of religious experience in the education process as being combative of the Formless Ogre. Even the Protestant Council of the City of New York, in its fund raising campaign this year, found it necessary to cite its great effectiveness in combatting juvenile delinquency (vocational and rehabilitative schools, chaplains in youth institutions, etc.).

The problem is not that there has been an exaggeration of the disturbance and rootlessness that prevails among our youth, but that it has been caricatured out of reality by a public bug-a-boo.

³ Dr. Bruno Bettelheim, connected with the Sonia Shankman Orthogenic School at the University of Chicago, author of *Love Is Not Enough*, Glencoe Free Press, 1950, and *Truants From Life* (The rehabilitation of emotionally disturbed children), Glencoe Free Press, 1955.

All The Sad Young Men*

JOHN COGLEY

AS LONG AS I can remember, older people have been deeply concerned about the youth of America—and often with good reason. There was the “flaming youth” of the 1920’s, and what denunciations were hurled at them and their hotcha ways! They were the “lost generation” who set out to find themselves in a sea of bathtub gin. But now it seems they were the last innocents. In retrospect their wickedness seems more silly than sinful. To the present war-hardened crop their excesses sound as quaint as the stylized indiscretions of Restoration comedy.

Then came the youth of the Depression. This was a stark, glum generation given to social protest and pessimism. They joined movements and combined a kind of naive faith in politics with an utter cynicism about America’s traditional copy-book maxims. If Clara Bow symbolized the spirit of the generation that preceded them, it was a put-upon Sylvia Sidney or an embittered John Garfield who mirrored their mood.

This generation, too, in its time was despaired of. They were denounced by everyone from Adolf Hitler to America’s own prophets of doom. They spent their early years either on the bum or on the dole. It was said that they were thereby corrupted; they had lost their initiative and would never work again. They were whiney and spoiled.

But what happened? They went off to war and proved that they were the equals of the toughest troops in the world. They came home, got married, and then went back to college, bringing babies and seriousness to the campuses of the U.S. In great numbers they moved to the suburbs and provided the leadership for what is now called America’s new conservatism. They no longer protest. They no longer march in picket lines. They vote Republican and wish everyone would forget about the passionate petitions they signed in the late Thirties.

They were followed by the generation someone dubbed “GI Junior.” During the war these kids earned man-sized salaries. Then their hero-brothers came home and displaced them. They felt keenly, it was said, that there was nothing heroic about them. It was freely predicted that they were going to suffer an explosive inferiority complex. They were doomed to prove themselves by resentful deeds of daring. They had to be watched.

This generation did not have it so easy, after all. They were drafted and sent all over the world to serve as Occupation troops. They had the boring tasks of

policing the area their elder brothers had conquered. They took what they wanted all right, but their weapon was not a gun but a chocolate bar.

They came home after it was over, to full employment and early marriage. They made Brooks Brothers the uniform of a nation. They followed their brothers to the suburbs, make more money than their fathers ever did, have more babies than any generation in a long time, and are probably more serious and conscientious than their grandfathers.

They know what they want and they are dogged about getting it. They don’t want either revolution or reaction. They want security and anyone who talks to them about security—whether it be economic, social or political—is sure to win their attention.

They might be the dullest generation in a long time and they have the faults of their qualities: the passion for security can lead to a creeping conformism. But if you watch them playing with their babies in the suburbs or poring over the latest issue of *Fortune* you realize that they are a wholesome, amazingly contented group—perhaps a bit too contented.

(Actually there was no Korean War generation. There were only the luckless fellows who got caught. Their age span ranged widely. They included veterans called back, youngsters fresh from high school, and the thirty-year men who did not dream in 1945 that in a short five years they would be back in a shooting war.)

Now we have the new, highly publicized Juvenile Delinquents, a small segment of today’s youngsters but a baffling one. They make their predecessors look timid indeed. They are children of violence. They take murder, rape and sadism as lightly as their predecessors took bathtub gin or necking in the back seat. No one seems to know what to do about them.

To undo corrupting influences visited on this generation, you would have to revoke much of the twentieth century. You would have to cancel out World War II so their fathers would be home with them when they were babies. You would have to demilitarize the third, fourth and fifth decades of this century so they would not have grown up in an age which treasures violence and rewards brutality. For some, you would have to obliterate the racial prejudices that doom them to sub-standard living and personal insecurity. You would have to undo the harm caused by their feeling that they are second-class citizens.

We cannot produce a peace-loving generation in a war-dominated time. We cannot produce the secure child—which is not to say a child with an exaggerated drive toward security, something else again

* Reprinted with permission from the *Commonweal*, July 1, 1955.

—in an age when fathers are called off to war, lonely mothers are sick with worry for years on end, and everyone has the jitters about whether Armageddon might break out tomorrow. We cannot seal off certain races and nationalities from the great American Op-

portunity we never tire of glorifying and then expect their children to grow up without bitterness. We cannot, it seems, have it both ways. We cannot have wars and injustice and hope thereby to gain the fruits of peace and justice.

Finland: State Church In A Democracy

WILLIAM RANDEL

WE WHO SUBSCRIBE to the theory of mutual non-interference between church and government are inclined to assume that a state church denies or limits religious freedom. In Finland, at least, this is clearly not so. If we hold any particular advantage over the Finns because of our historic opposition to an established religion, it lies in the contribution our multiple churches make to our practice of democracy.

Finland must rank very high in proportionate church membership for the simple reason that the state church (Lutheran) enrolls each Finn at birth. Currently the membership is estimated at about 97% of the population. The remaining three per-cent are Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant in a variety of sects. Most of the communicants in these churches are foreign by birth or extraction; very few are converts from Lutheranism. And most of these "foreign" congregations are in Helsinki, which, as the capital, is the most cosmopolitan city.

It should be remembered that Finland is highly homogeneous, and that the only sizable minority, the Swedish-speaking ten percent, represent migrations centuries ago from the country that introduced the church to Finland. It is also pertinent that this minority was established in Finland long before Protestantism; for Finland was a Swedish province as early as the twelfth century. However much Finns may resemble Americans in other ways, Finland never has been, is not now, and has no likelihood of becoming a "melting-pot," a "nation of many nations." Constitutional prohibition of an established religion proved a far greater good in the United States than the framers of the Bill of Rights could possibly have foreseen; yet it is not necessarily a self-evident and universal good. It has worked for us, and may therefore, by the pragmatic formula, be considered good—for us. In a small nation with no recent history of new racial elements and with virtually the entire population belonging for centuries to a single church, it might seem self-evident that that church should have an official status.

Finns who visit the United States, especially as students at our universities, report the amazement they felt when first subjected to the pressure of militant sectarianism. Most of our universities, state or private, include in their registration forms a space for church membership or preference; and once the unsuspecting Finn has completed the forms he is the

object of considerable competition for his loyalty. If he writes 'Lutheran' the campus Lutherans hunt him down and he quickly learns of a bewildering variety of Lutheran synods. To leave the space blank or guardedly write 'Protestant' is to open the door to other groups—Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, and so forth. It seems to be a particular triumph to sign up a foreign student. Back home in Finland there was never such a struggle for his soul; he simply belonged to the official church, paid his church tax when due, and attended if and when he pleased. If he felt strongly enough that he did not wish to continue as a member, he could sign a certain form and be completely free; it is no more difficult than registering to vote.

In practice, even apart from the right of withdrawing, Finland's state church is anything but compulsive. Membership is not a legal prerequisite to holding public office or a chair at the university or anything else of that sort. Compulsiveness, Finns who travel discover, is far more likely to be the hall-mark of a free church, especially if it is the sort that equates non-membership and non-attendance with sin. The more blatant forms of American evangelism repel most intelligent Americans; it is hardly surprising that such behavior annoys our Finnish visitors, who are relieved to get back home, where the church leaves them alone.

The only evangelism now observable in Finland is provided by a contingent of some fifty American Mormons, fine young men who carry their gospel from door to door but make little headway. So far, the Lutheran church has nothing to fear from them. The simpler Finns who might be persuaded to adopt a strange new religion cannot understand English, while the missionaries can hardly become fluent in Finnish in the two and a half years of their assignment. Most Finns who speak English, moreover, are of the more intellectual classes least interested in religion of any type. Yet the Mormon experiment is interesting and will bear watching.

As for the Lutheran clergy, they can have little incentive to seek new members because there is nobody to convert; every citizen automatically belongs to the church and always will belong unless he withdraws—and very few do. Like other civil servants the clergy are paid out of public funds and need not watch the collection plates with anxious eyes. A con-

scientious priest may hope for good attendance and try to lead his followers along the paths of righteousness; but his economic welfare does not depend on the members who attend his church or his ability to wring generous offerings from them. In the dim past when Finland was a remote, wild region, the church faced a stupendous task of conversion, but the work was finished long ago. Without the prod of serious competition there is no need for change; the stress is on ritual, dogma, and beauty of worship and not on emotional fervor or ethical Christianity, to cite two American extremes.

For a well-educated Finn, keenly aware of intellectual currents in our dynamic modern world, a static church can have slight genuine appeal; and what is more important, religion itself, apart from its institutions, ceases to be a topic of any interest. The Finn of this sort cannot understand why so many Americans go to church and, whether or not they attend or belong, or even believe, spend so much time discussing religion. For intellectual Finns the church has become, unhappily, just another public institution, like the art galleries and concert halls, to be supported through taxes and visited as often or as seldom as one wishes. No more stigma attaches to non-attendance at church than to non-attendance at symphony concerts or art exhibits.

The American brand of democracy thrives on the uninhibited discussion of dissimilar views, and perhaps in no other area are the shades of opinion more numerous and varied than in our multiple free churches. The experience of church diversity, common to virtually all American communities, is valuable as a training-ground for the compromising necessary all up and down the line of public affairs. Without abandoning our own religious views, we at least learn, through argument and "bull sessions," of existing differences, and manage to live together despite our often irreconcilable views. But the most valuable contribution of our free churches, which only the most obtuse and bigoted among us can ignore, is the awareness they provide that all Americans belong to minority groups; no one church has a majority of all our church members.

The Finnish brand of democracy, based on historic individualism and resistance to aggression, apparently does not need the fortifying experience of religious debate. It is as hard to conceive of that closely-knit nation being divided by sectarian dissensions as our sprawling young giant of a country supporting a single church. Thomas Jefferson lived to deplore the venality of our press but never modified his faith that our press should be free. It is better, he knew, to have the worst abuses of freedom than the kind of suppression that leads either to rebellion or to the atrophy of individual opinion. America's free churches, like our journals, are often venal enough, but the alternative of a state church would be a sorry reversal of the best in our tradition. Taxes levied on the whole body

of citizens to support one recognized church went out, we congratulate ourselves, with the other vestiges of theocratic Calvinism. The Finns live by different traditions, and if they support an institution that would be anathema for us we have no right to say they are wrong. Their democratic nature simply cannot be measured in the same terms as ours; their national church has no bearing on the subject, any more than the demonstrable fact that their church buildings far surpass most of ours in aesthetic level.

One ultimately justifiable comment—perhaps the only one—concerning the state church in Finland is that its members—and that means the great majority of all Finns—cannot know the emotional and intellectual excitement rising out of our religious diversity. Our literature, for example, would lose much of its savor without the religious undercurrents so apparent in so many writers: Edwards, Paine, Hawthorne, Emerson, William James, and Henry Adams, among others. The American visitor in Finland comes up against a blank wall of apathy if he mentions religion, and it takes him a little while to understand why. Finns have freedom of religion, in their own way, but to put it mildly they miss all the stimulation we derive from our sectarianism. This is the greatest dissimilarity between us.

Editorial Notes

(Continued from page 178)

hundred million more wait for emancipation. The emancipated ones have residual resentments, not so much because of economic exploitation as against the white man's arrogance. The people under colonial rule have obvious resentments against their masters, even if, as in some instances, they are not completely ready for self-government. This is the wide expanse in which the struggle between communism and democracy must take place. The obvious advantage which communism has in this territory, given past history and present illusions, is so great that only the wisest democratic statesmanship can lead democracy to victory.

For some time there has been a struggle within the Administration between those who wanted to balance the budget, naturally led by the Secretary of the Treasury, and those, like Mr. Stassen and Mr. Rockefeller, who were not willing to do this at the price of cutting our foreign aid program. The President made the final decision, after he was well enough to make policy decisions. Just as he was about to make the decision, the Russians began to take a leaf from our book and promised technical aid to every Asian nation visited by them.

Perhaps it was this competition which was needed to insure the presidential decision in favor of foreign aid as against the balanced budget. The right decision was fortunately made, though somewhat confusedly. It would be ridiculous for a nation as wealthy as ours

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to stint on foreign aid because so many people want a balanced budget and ultimately a tax cut. The foreign aid program represents the expression of responsibility of a very wealthy nation for the welfare of the poorer nations in the free alliance. It is also a necessary moral discipline for the world's most fortunate nation. R.N.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editors:

In reply to Dr. Blake's reply to me, I would like to clear up a misunderstanding. I don't vote, because I'm not allowed to vote. I stated in my letter that I was reporting from "the outside of the inside," and this is quite literally true. I am not a member of the general committee of the Department of Worship and the Arts, and therefore have no vote. I do not quarrel with this ruling of the National Council. I state it as a fact. Surely Dr. Blake must know this.

More important, Dr. Blake asks that "truly artistic" people influence the Council by working at it from within. That is precisely what we are trying to do, and so far the overall results have been microscopic. The commissions on drama, literature, painting, architecture, music were formed over two years ago—a short

time, perhaps, but nevertheless half of the life of the National Council itself. These commissions were formed by calling together strong, creative men and women, of proved worth in their chosen field, willing at their own expense and time to dedicate the substance of their learning and experience to the service of Jesus Christ through the National Council. Alfred Barr of the Museum of Modern Art is not just "artistic." He is an expert. Norris Houghton, co-director of the Phoenix Theatre, is not just "artistic." He is an expert. They know their fields, they know their public, they have survived the acid test of New York City, and are still financially solvent without having prostituted their art one bit. That's an expert. And that kind of knowledge and experience is eagerly offered to the National Council—and from the inside.

Most important, Dr. Blake warns that no small group can impose a canon of artistic taste upon a democratic organization. I wish this were true! Certainly our small group wouldn't dream of it. We know all about canons of taste, and we're against them. But some small group has. The denominations in the past, and now the National Council itself, are nursing a canon of artistic taste, fast slipping from sick to rigid. And the extraordinary thing about this death-scene is that the doctors are right in the other room. Will the nurse call the doctors? See the next installment!

Seriously, the present canon of artistic taste which is everywhere in evidence in the churches is dangerous, dangerous to the Church not only artistically, but theologically, dangerous because it denies in the most concrete way the "nowness" and "hereness" of Him we preach. "Not Herod, not Caiaphas, not Pilate, not Judas ever contrived to fasten upon Jesus Christ the reproach of insipidity; that final indignity was left for pious hands to inflict"* If the glove fits . . . and it need not fit!

The National Council is an adult organization now. As an adult it knows that each great step forward is accompanied with an equal peril. To call together, in these commissions, the caliber of men and women that it has, is a great step forward. To fail to use them is an equal peril.

Barbara Sargent
Bath, Maine

* Dorothy Sayers

Authors in this Issue

Having recently resigned as minister of the Judson Memorial Church in New York City, Robert W. Spike is Secretary for Evangelism of the Congregational Christian Church.

John Cogley was formerly Executive Editor of the Commonweal, and is now engaged in free lance work.

William Randel, professor of American Literature and Director of American Studies at Florida State University, was the first visiting professor sent to Finland in 1950.

Errata

27462 11-56 In our November 28, 1955 issue we mistakenly stated that D. B. Robertson studied in Germany on a Fulbright Fellowship. Mr. Robertson's study was made possible by the Fund for the Advancement of Education of the Ford Foundation. He did not intend to "declaim," but rather to "disclaim" any special validity for his impressions of Germany (page 155, column 1, line 1). We regret this proof reader's error.

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